NTSB Status: Open – Initial Response Received
Issue date: 10/27/2009
Accident Date: 11/1/2007
Source Event: ACCIDENT
Location: Carmichael Mississippi
View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]
Background Synopsis:
On November 1, 2007, at 10:35:02 a.m. central daylight time, a 12-inch-diameter pipeline segment operated by Dixie Pipeline Company (Dixie) was transporting liquid propane at about 1,405 pounds per square inch, gauge (psig), when it ruptured in a rural area near Carmichael, Mississippi. The resulting gas cloud expanded over nearby homes and ignited, creating a large fireball that was heard and seen from miles away. About 10,253 barrels (430,626 gallons) of propane were released. As a result of the ensuing fire, two people were killed and seven people sustained minor injuries. Four houses were destroyed, and several others were damaged. About 71.4 acres of grassland and woodland were burned. Dixie reported that property damage resulting from the accident, including the loss of product, was $3,377,247.
Recommendation:
The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration: Initiate a program to evaluate pipeline operators’ public education programs, including pipeline operators’ self-evaluations of the effectiveness of their public education programs. Provide the National Transportation Safety Board with a timeline for implementation and completion of this evaluation. Conduct a comprehensive study to identify actions that can be implemented by pipeline operators to eliminate catastrophic longitudinal seam failures in electric resistance welded pipe (ERW); at a minimum, the study should include assessments of the effectiveness and effects of in-line inspection tools, hydrostatic pressure tests, and spike pressure tests; pipe material strength characteristics and failure mechanisms; the effects of aging on ERW pipelines; operational factors; and data collection and predictive analysis.
Rec #: P-07-007
NTSB Status: Open – Acceptable Response
Issue date: 6/25/2007
Accident Date: 10/27/2004
Source Event: ACCIDENT
Location: Kingman Kansas
View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]
Background Synopsis:
About 11:15 a.m. central daylight time on October 27, 2004, an 8-inch-diameter pipeline owned by Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P., (Magellan) and operated by Enterprise Products Operating L.P. (Enterprise) ruptured near Kingman, Kansas, and released approximately 4,858 barrels (204,000 gallons) of anhydrous ammonia. Nobody was killed or injured due to the release. The anhydrous ammonia leaked into a creek and killed more than 25,000 fish including some from threatened species. Enterprise reported that the cost of the accident was $680,715, including $459,415 for environmental remediation.
Recommendation:
The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration: Require in 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.52 that a pipeline operator must have a procedure to calculate and provide a reasonable initial estimate of released product in the telephonic report to the National Response Center if significant new information becomes available during the emergency response.
NTSB Status: Open – Acceptable Response
Issue date: 7/1/2004
Accident Date: 7/4/2002
Source Event: ACCIDENT
Location: Cohasset Minnesota
View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]
Background Synopsis:
About 2:12 a.m., central daylight time, on July 4, 2002, a 34-inch-diameter steel pipeline owned and operated by Enbridge Pipelines, LLC ruptured in a marsh west of Cohasset, Minnesota. Approximately 6,000 barrels (252,000 gallons) of crude oil were released from the pipeline as a result of the rupture. No deaths or injuries resulted from the release. The cost of the accident was approximately $5.6 million, which includes the cost of cleanup and recovery, value of lost product, and damage to the property of the pipeline operator and others. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the July 4, 2002, pipeline rupture near Cohasset, Minnesota, was inadequate loading of the pipe for transportation that allowed a fatigue crack to initiate along the seam of the longitudinal weld during transit. After the pipe was installed, the fatigue crack grew with pressure cycle stresses until the crack reached a critical size and the pipe ruptured.
Recommendation:
The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (Originally issued to RSPA): Remove the exemption in 49 Code of Federal Regulations 192.65 (b) that permits pipe to be placed in natural gas service after pressure testing when the pipe can not be verified to have been transported in accordance with the American Petroleum Institute’s recommended practice RP 5L1. Amend 49 Code of Federal Regulations to require that natural gas pipeline operators (Part 192) and hazardous liquid pipeline operators (Part 195) follow the American Petroleum Institute’s recommended practice RP 5LW for transportation of pipe on marine vessels. Evaluate the need for a truck transportation standard to prevent damage to pipe, and, if needed, develop the standard and incorporate it in 49 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 192 and 195 for both natural gas and hazardous liquid line pipe.
NTSB Status: Open – Acceptable Response
Issue date: 6/22/2001
Accident Date: 7/7/1998
Source Event: ACCIDENT
Location: SOUTH RIDING Virginia
View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]
Background Synopsis:
About 12:55 A.M. on 7/7/98, a natural gas explosion and fire destroyed a newly constructed residence in the south riding community in Loudoun County, Virginia. A family consisting of a husband and wide and their two children were spending their first night in their new home at the time of the explosion. As a result of the accident, the wife was killed, the husband seriously injured and the two children received minor injuries. Five other homes and two vehicles were damaged. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident was the corrosion and subsequent overheating and arcing at a splice in one of the conductors of the Triplex electrical service line which, because of inadequate seperation between the electrical conductors and the gas service line, led to the failure of the Gas Service line and the subsequent uncontrolled release of natural gas that accumulated in the basement and was subsequently ignited, precipitating the electrical service line failure was damage done to the electrical service line during installation of the gas service line and/or during subsequent excavation of the electrical line.
Recommendation:
The NTSB recommends that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (originally issued to RSPA): require that excess flow valves be installed in all new and renewed gas service lines, regardless of a customer’s classification, when the operating conditions are compatible with readily available valves.
Rec #: P-99-012
NTSB Status: Open – Acceptable Response
Issue date: 6/1/1999
Accident Date:
Source Event: SPECIAL STUDY
Location: Mode: PIPELINE
View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]
Background Synopsis:
During the 1980’s, the National Transportaion Safety Board investigated several accidents that involved operator fatigue. Following completion of these accident investigations, the Safety Board in 1989 issued three recommendations to the U.S. Dept. of Transportation (DOT): Expediate a coordinated research program on the effects of fatigue, sleepiness, sleep disorders, and circadian factors on transportation system safety (I-89-1), Develop and disseminate educational material for transportation industry personnel and management regarding shift work; work and rest schedules; and proper regimens of health, diet and rest (I-89-2) and review and upgrade regulations governing hours of service for all transportation modes to assure that they are consistent and that they incorporate the results of the latest research on fatigue and sleep issues (I-89-3).
Recommendation:
The NTSB recommends that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (originally issued to RSPA): Establish within 2 years scientifically based hours-of-service regulations that set limits on hours of service, provide predictable work and rest schedules, and consider circadian rhythms and human sleep and rest requirements.
Rec #: P-98-002
NTSB Status: Open – Acceptable Response
Issue date: 4/30/1998
Accident Date:
Source Event: SPECIAL STUDY
View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]
Background Synopsis:
Despite the general acceptance of plastic piping as a safe and economical alternative to piping made of steel or other materials, the Board notes that a number of pipeline accidents it has investigated have involved plastic piping that cracked in a brittle-like manner. For example, on 10/17/94, an explosion and fire in Waterloo, Iowa, destroyed a building and damaged other property. Six persons died and seven were injured in the accident. The Board investigation determined that the natural gas has been released from a plastic service pipe that had failed in a brittle-like manner at a connection to a steel main.
Recommendation:
The NTSB recommends that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (originally issued to RSPA): Determine the extent of the susceptibility to premature Brittle-like cracking of older plastic piping (beyond that piping marketed by Century Utility Products, INC.) that remains in use for gas service nationwide. Inform gas system operators of the findings & require them to closely monitor the performance of the older plastic piping & identify & replace, in a timely manner, any of the piping that indicates poor performance based on such evaluation factors as installation, operating & environmental conditions; piping failure characteristics; & leak history.